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Brantley: Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort.

WRONGFUL BIRTH: THE EMERGING STATUS
OF A NEW TORT
JOHN R. BRANTLEY
Presently, abortion and contraception are highly inflammatory subjects
since they tend to raise questions involving rights of privacy and basic social
mores.' As part of the controversy engendered by these extreme fluctuations in public opinion, the courts have been faced with an increasing
amount of litigation concerning actions for "wrongful birth," that is, actions
for wrongfully causing a child to be born. Judicial recognition of such
actions has been hampered by the questionable ability of the courts to
accurately discern rapidly changing public policy, 2 and to measure damages
with reasonable certainty.3
1. Witherspoon, The New Pro-Life Legislation: Patterns and Recommendations, 7
The abundance of material in this area evinces the level of
public concern. See, e.g., Coburn, Sterilization Regulations: Debate Not Quelled by
HEW Document, 183 SCIENCE 935, 937 (1974) (indicating possibility of governmental
coercion in connection with welfare programs and sterlization of Blacks in the South);
Degnan, Law, Morals, and Abortion, 100 COMMONWEAL 305 (1974) (explanation of
various moral and legal positions on abortion); Edelstein, Herman, & Herman, Moral
Consistency and the Abortion Issue, 100 COMMONWEAL 59, 60 (1974) (deploring
prevailing inconsistency between right to life before and after birth); Lamed, The
Greening of the Womb, NEW TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1974, at 35 (criticizing the increasing use
of the hysterectomy as a means of family planning); Furor Over the Abortion IssueHotter Than Ever, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, March 4, 1974, at 43 (indicating a
steep rise in abortions since 1968); Second Thoughts About Abortions, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, March 3, 1975, at 78 (discussing implications of conviction of Boston
physician for murdering fetus by performing an abortion). The demographic effects of
liberalized abortion and contraception have been analyzed for the United States in Sklar
& Berkov, Abortion, Illegitimacy, and the American Birth Rate, 185 SCIENCE 909, 914
(1974) (concluding that through 1971 liberalized abortion depressed overall fertility, and
particularly illegitimate fertility). The observed experience of the United States for a
short period of time is in accord with the postwar experience of the Eastern European
countries, as shown in McIntyre, The Fertility Response to Abortion Reform in Eastern
Europe: Demographic and Economic Implications, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST, Vol. 16,
No. 2, Fall 1972, at 45, 61.
2. Compare Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating
that in action by parents of a normal child born as the result of unsuccessful sterilization,
birth of child is not always a blessed event) with Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620,
622 (Minn. 1934) (holding that birth of a normal child is a blessing, even when
unplanned). The term "wrongful birth" is used in this paper as a generic term including
actions brought by both parents and children, corresponding to the phrase "wrongful life"
used by the courts, because it more accurately reflects the gravamen of the cause of
action.
3. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967). The court, faced with a
claim by a deformed infant that he should have been aborted, held that the traditional
ST. MARY's L.J. 637 (1976).
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The action for wrongful birth seems to be an outgrowth of the tangled
skein created by the escalating conflict between two recent trends in the law
of torts. These two developments reflect the divergent attitudes of society
toward the rights of both unborn children and the women who must bear
those children. The first and most recognized trend, although the slowest to
develop, is the right of a child to recover for prenatal injuries. While the
4
common law was at first adamant in its refusal to allow such an action,
initial recognition came in 1946, and today the action is universally allowed.5

Accompanying this recognition was a movement toward an expansion of
the right of privacy to include a woman's right to control her own bodily
functions - including the right to terminate her pregnancy. 6 As a result of
these antithetical developments, the status of the fetus as a legal entity has
become a modern dilemma. 7 This quandary has contributed to the reluctcompensatory damages could not be measured where it entailed a comparison between
life with defects and the void of nonexistence.
4. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884) (Holmes, J.) (no recovery
for injuries sustained by child in its mother's womb). While the common law rule
precluded recovery, the rule was not unanimously accepted. In Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting) a strong appeal was made for
recognition of a right of action for injuries to a viable fetus that was subsequently born
alive. The rationale of Dietrich was nevertheless accepted in Texas. Magnolia CocaCola B. Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
5. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (initial recognition). The
early cases following Bonbrest required that the fetus be viable at the time of injury.
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (Md. 1951); Stegall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d
577, 581 (Mo. 1953); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225, 228 (Ore. 1955). More recent
decisions have not stressed the requirement of viability. Daley v. Meier, 178 N.E.2d
691, 694 (Ill. Ct. App. 1961); Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich.
1971); Labree v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 818 (R.I. 1973). "Viability" means that the
fetus is capable of living outside the womb. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (R.I.
1966). When first recognizing the right of recovery for prenatal injuries in Leal v. Pitts
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. 1967), the Texas Supreme Court held
that the cause of action was limited to a viable fetus, but in Delgado v. Yandell, 468
S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), affd, 471 S.W.2d 569 (1971) the court
of civil appeals abandoned the limitation of viability. Universal recognition of the cause
of action for prenatal injuries occurred in 1972, when Alabama allowed recovery. Huskey
v. Smith, 265 So. 2d 596, 598 (Ala. 1972) (inexplicably limiting recovery to a viable
fetus). Alabama abandoned the limitation of viability in Wolfe v. Isabell, 280 So. 2d
758, 761 (Ala. 1973). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
55, at 335 (4th ed. 1971) (prenatal injuries); 2 J. SCHMITIr, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER V-46 (1975) (defining viability); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d
1222 (1971) (prenatal injuries).
6. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973) (Georgia criminal abortion statute held
unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). In Wade the Texas
criminal abortion statutes were held unconstitutional as violative of a woman's fundamental right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Abortions in the first
trimester of pregnancy were held to be outside the realm of state regulation, but
abortions during the second trimester may be regulated in the interest of the health of
the mother. Subsequent to viability, however, the State may proscribe abortion.
7. The conflict between the two trends is even more apparent when one considers
the status of the fetus as regards the law of property. The common law regarded an
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ance of the courts to extend the rights of the fetus when faced with suits by
children alleging that they have been damaged by the very fact of their birth,
and who seek compensation for their wrongful life. Consequently the courts
have, with only one exception, emphatically refused to create a new cause of
action for wrongful birth in favor of an infant.8 Indeed the novelty of the
phrase itself has caused courts to deny recovery in actions brought by
parents who seek recovery for the birth of a child.9 The problem of
whether the law should recognize a cause of action in favor of a child against
those responsible for its being, or whether to do so is "to enter an area in
which no one could find his way,"' 10 has been hampered by the failure of
some courts to distinguish true wrongful birth actions from actions which
merely contain elements of a wrongful birth action. The result has been an
indiscriminate application of the reasoning of the wrongful birth cases in
actions where basic negligence principles should have been applied.'"
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL BIRTH

Actions for wrongful birth have been litigated under warranty, tort, and
contract. 12 Because of the special difficulties involved in suits on contract
unborn child as capable of receiving a legacy, a copyhold estate, and to take an estate
limited to its use when subsequently born, as if alive when the event occurred. 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 130.
The conflict can be illustrated by a hypothetical.
Suppose that a woman, in the first trimester of pregnancy, learns that a bequest has been
made to her and her children. While the present law indicates that she could increase
her share by aborting the fetus, logic and equity dictate that this result should not be
permitted. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 349, 369 (1971).
8. Recovery denied: Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ohio
1975); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); Williams v.
State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1966); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 313
N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975). Cause of action stated:
Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 241 (10th Cir. 1973).
9. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). The parents of a child with
birth defects seeking damages for the failure of physician to inform them of the effects
of rubella were denied recovery based on the reasoning that tort damages should not be
recoverable for the denial of the opportunity to take embryonic life. Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (parents' suit
for damages due to defendant's failure to abort rubella stricken fetus was dismissed).
10. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J. 1967) (Weintraub, J.,dissenting
in part).
11. See Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1970) (court dismissed parents' action as unknown to law without adequately
discussing tort theory).
12. In Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964), a child born out of wedlock as the result of a seduction, unsuccessfully
sued his putative father alleging in one count that he was a third party beneficiary of the
father's promise of marriage. Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (Wash. 1964) (action
by husband and wife alleging breach of warranty in failure to render husband sterile). In
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975), mother and child sued in

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 1, Art. 9

:1976]

COMMENTS

or warranty theories, i3 the majority of the wrongful birth suits have occurred
in tort. 1 4 While free from the burden of proving the elements of a contractwarranty action, recovery under negligence has also encountered numerous
problems. Recovery has been denied on grounds of public policy, the
difficulty of measuring damages, lack of causation, absence of statutory
authority, lack of duty, and because the concept is without foundation in law
or logic.15
Recovery in tort for wrongful birth was at first uniformly denied by the
courts,16 but in recent years recovery has been allowed in a small but
growing number of jurisdictions. 17 A careful examination of the cases,
tort for the defendant's failure to diagnose rubella so that the fetus could be aborted;
the child's claim was denied and the mother's allowed. Id. at 376-77.
13. Plaintiffs in warranty and contract actions must prove the existence of a
contract to achieve a specific medical result. Absent this contract, the physician does
not warrant the success of the operation. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463
(S.D.W. Va. 1967). In proving the contract, the courts distinguish between a "therapeutic reassurance" to the patient of the physician's opinion and the making of a warranty.
Rogala v. Silva, 305 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973). The courts may require that
the warranty be express, that the plaintiff prove his reliance on the warranty, and the
payment of a separate consideration. Id. at 573. These difficulties may be aggravated
by the standard practice of signing a disclaimer of warranties upon admission to the
hospital. Herrera v. Roessing, 533 P.2d 60, 61 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). See generally
Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1972). The principal advantage in the contract-warranty
action is the longer statute of limitations. Doerr v. Villate, 220 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1966). This advantage, however, is dissipated in those jurisdictions that have
adopted the discovery rule. Under this rule, a cause of action for medical malpractice
accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the patient discovers, or in the
exercise of reasonable care for his own welfare, should have discovered the resulting
injury. Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974). See also Annot., 27
A.L.R.3d 906 (1969); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 388 (1961).
14. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Custodio v.
Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (Ct. App. 1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974);
Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190
N.E.2d 849, 852 (ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. 1967); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 332
N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (1972), affg 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970); Williams
v. State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233
N.W.2d 372, 374 (Wis. 1975); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Wis. 1974).
15. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (lack of
causation); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (without
foundation in law or logic); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967)
(public policy); Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (lack of duty);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975) (damages); Slawek v.
Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Wis. 1974) (absence of statutory authority).
16. E.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (I1. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1964); Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967);
Williams v. State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 241
(10th Cir. 1973) (action by mongoloid children for birth defects); Custodio v. Bauer, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Ct. App. 1967) (action for cost of raising child by parents of
normal child born after unsuccessful sterilization); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503
(Fla. Ct. App. 1970) (suit by patient for negligently failing to sterilize, who gave birth
to a normal child, not barred by public policy); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 340
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however, reveals confusion as to the true nature of a suit for wrongful birth.
*The present trend is merely the result of the discernment by the courts of the
distinction between an action for wrongful birth and an action for medical
malpractice that contains elements of the wrongful birth action.' 8 By
classifying the cases according to the party bringing the action and the
character of the recovery sought, certain factual distinctions become clear
and an alternative method of characterization may be suggested.
The PotentialPlaintiffs

The obvious method of distinguishing the various cases encompassed by
the phrase "wrongful birth" is by determining who brings the action. Actions
by parents for the wrongful birth of their children have frequently followed
an unsuccessful sterilization and have been brought on both contract-

warranty and tort theories. 19 Numerous actions have been brought by
parents seeking damages for a physician's failure to diagnose rubella, which
resulted in their child being deformed at birth. 20 Another unique contem(N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (action by patient who became pregnant after tubal ligation
termed "wrongful pregnancy"); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1974) (action by woman for failure of doctor to diagnose her pregnancy in
time for her to terminate it); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (suit
by parents of child born with rubella syndrome against doctor who failed to diagnose it).
18. In Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), the court
distinguished a cause of action for wrongful birth or life from a cause of action for
wrongful pregnancy, holding that an action would lie for the latter, but not for the
former. Similar distinctions have been noted by other courts. See Betancourt v. Gaylor,
344 A.2d 336, 339 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975); Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 841 (Sup.
Ct. 1974); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975). But see Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967) (parents of deformed child born as result of
defendant's failure to diagnose rubella had no cause of action); Stewart v. Long Island
College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (no cause of action for
parents of deformed child for defendant's failure to abort child).
19. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (warranty);
Custodio v. Bauej, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (Ct. App. 1967) (contract); Rogala v. Silva,
305 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973) (warranty) Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d
834, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (contract). In the male, the sterilization operation is called a
vasectomy. It is a minor surgical operation involving the ligation of the vas deferens. 2
J. SCHMIDT, AT'TORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WoRD FINDER V-13 (1975);
Kaufman, Vasectomy: Medical and Legal Aspects, TRAUMA Vol. 1, No. 5, at 110, 115
(1960).
In the female, the operation is termed a tubal ligation, and involves the
severing and tying of the fallopian tubes. Wolfe, Female Sexual Sterilization, 41 J. KY.
MED. ASS'N. 87 (1973); Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415, 416
(1965).
Examples of tort actions are: Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124,
125 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974).
20. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 332 N.Y.S.2d
640 (1973); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
Rubella, or German measles, is an acute
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porary example is a suit by the parents for the failure to diagnose a
pregnancy so that the mother, for purely personal reasons, could obtain an
abortion. 21 It is apparent that these actions by the parents contain elements
of a wrongful birth action because the gravamen of the cause of action
is the birth of a child. 22 Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish actions
which allege the wrongful birth of a person other than the plaintiff, from
those which allege that the plaintiff himself should not have been born.28
When the plaintiff alleges that his own birth was wrongful, in effect he asks
the court to judicially determine that he should not have been allowed to
live 2 4 but when another person such as a parent alleges that the infant
should not have been born, the parent does not seek to negate his own
present existence. 25 The parent is in reality seeking damages for injuries
causally related to the fact of birth, but not for the birth itself. 26 Thus, the
parents are not placed in the anomalous position of trying to sue themselves
into oblivion, as are the children. The parents' action for damages for the
birth of a child born subsequent to an unsuccessful sterilization operation is
not subject to the logical difficulties present in actions by the children. In
spite of the obstacles of logic, however, children have sued claiming that they
should not have been born.
Three classes of children have brought actions for wrongful birth: prior
born, illegitimate, and deformed children. Typically, a prior born child
brings an action against the doctor whose sterilization operation on one of the
parents was a failure, seeking damages for the diminution of his share of
love, affection, and pecuniary inheritance due to the subsequently born
child.2 7 Without exception, these claims have been denied, apparently since
infectious fever that has only mild effects on the pregnant mother, but when contracted
in the first trimester of pregnancy it may have a devastating effect on the fetus. The
primary deformities include congenital heart disease, cataracts, and hearing defects. The
probability of deformation, once thought to be 100 percent, is now estimated at between
10 and 20 percent. 1 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY's DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD
FINDER G-14 (1974); Anderson, Viruses, TRAUMA Vol. 8, No. 4, at 19, 23 (1966);
Ferguson, Pregnancy-Normaland Abnormal, in 5 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY
FOR THE ATrORNEY 239, 313 (P. Cantor, ed. 1961).
21. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974); Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Wis. 1974).
22. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975); Hays v. Hall,
477 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Wis.
1975).
23. This distinction has been noted by several courts. Coleman v. Garrison, 327
A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 338 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1975); Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 841 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Jacobs v.Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
24. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
25. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Cox. v.
.
Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 841 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
26. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
27. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct.. App. 1974).
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the prior born children cannot find a satisfactory basis of liability. 28 The
children did not contract with the doctor, therefore, no recovery is possible in
contract or warranty unless the children can be viewed as third party
beneficiaries of the contract to sterilize their parent. This is unlikely since
only intended beneficiaries have any rights under a contract, and the
children at best would be only incidental beneficiaries.2 9 Nor may recovery
in tort be sustained, since the basic elements of a tort are absent. The
physician's duty is to his patient and not to the prior born children. Absent
this duty, no liability arises. Even if the existence of a duty is to be
assumed, the breach of it is only actionable if it injures the plaintiff. Where
the plaintiff is injured and has no vested right in the interest he claims, he cannot recover. 30 Thus, any action by prior born children for the birth of another child is "without foundation in law or logic,"'" and no recovery should
be allowed.
An equally novel approach has been taken by those illegitimate children
who bring suit, against one of their parents, for allowing them to be born
illegitimate. In fact, the phrase "wrongful life" originated in such an
action.32 These cases normally involve a situation in which the illegitimate
child is bringing suit for damages against his putative father for deprivation
of a normal home life and the stigma of illegitimacy.38 The courts have
been unmoved by the recitation of the burdens of bastardy when compared
with non-existence, and have denied recovery in all cases. 3 4 The status of
28. In Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 618 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), the trial
court held that an action by prior born children against a doctor who negligently
sterilized their mother was not barred by public policy. On appeal, the case was
remanded for error in submitting a question of law to the jury. Wilmington Medical
Center v. Coleman, 298 A.2d 320, 322 (Del. 1972). On remand, the action of the prior
born children was not discussed and summary judgment was granted the defendant due to
insufficiency of the pleadings. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974). In Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 841 (Sup. Ct. 1974), the cause of action
on behalf of the prior born children was dismissed as unknown to the law.
29. This claim has not been raised in any case involving prior born children.
30. Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
31. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
32. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964); see Note, 50 A.B.A.J. 682 (1964); Note, 28 ALBANY L. REv. 174
(1964); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1349 (1964); Note, 49 IowA L. REv. 1005 (1964);
Note, 25 Omo S. L.J. 145 (1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv.780 (1964).
33. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 851 (11l. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964).
34. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967) (action by
illegitimate daughter against her father for causing her to be born in a state of
illegitimacy); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1964) (suit by illegitimate son against putative father for fraudulently
inducing plaintiff's mother to have sexual relations with defendant by promise of
marriage); Williams v. State, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (1966) (action by illegitimate child
of inmate in state mental hospital against the State for its negligence in failing to protect
plaintiff's mother from sexual assault resulting in birth of plaintiff); Slawek v. Stroh, 215
N.W.2d 9, 22 (Wis. 1974) (father of illegitimate child sued mother and child for
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the law is questionable, however, in Illinois and Florida despite denials of
recovery. In Zepeda v. Zepeda,35 the Illinois Court of Appeals denied
recovery, but nevertheless held that the father's conduct was tortious as to
the plaintiff.36 Denial of recovery was predicated on public policy grounds,
even though the court recognized the inconsistency of such a decision.37 In
Pinkney v. Pinkney,3s the Florida Court of Appeals denied the existence of
such a cause of action, but Pinkney was expressly overruled by the Florida
Supreme Court in Brown v. Bray.39 Unfortunately, the Brown decision
misconstrued the holding of Pinkney, making the status of the portion of
Pinkney concerning wrongful birth actions uncertain. 40 Despite these
anomalies, the prevailing view is that no cause of action should be recognized in favor of an illegitimate child for the fact of his birth, absent
legislative sanction. 41
The cases that have caused the courts the most difficulties have been those
brought by deformed children who seek to recover for their impairments.
Despite the sympathy evoked by such claims, the courts have uniformly
denied recovery. 42 The landmark decision in this area is Gleitman v.
declaration of his visitation rights and was answered with counterclaim by child alleging
wrongful birth).
35. 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
36. Id. at 852.
37. Id. at 855-56. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1,
at 2 (4th ed. 1971) (damages are essential part of tort action).
38. 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
39. 300 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1974).
40. The Florida Supreme Court in Brown v. Bray, faced with an action to determine
the constitutionality of a Florida bastardy statute, purported to overrule the Pinkney
decision upon the rationale of Levy v; Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, the
United States Supreme Court held that an illegitimate child could recover for the
wrongful death of his parent. Id. at 72. This decision implies that the Florida court
viewed Pinkney as holding that an illegitimate child could not recover for the wrongful
death of the parent. Pinkney did not so hold, but rather held that the father's acts in
defending himself from the mother's assault did not constitute a wrong under the
wrongful death statute. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
Thus, Brown overruled Pinkney on a proposition of law not established by Pinkney, and
by expressing disapproval of the entire Pinkney decision, Brown cast doubt on the
portion of Pinkney dealing with wrongful birth.
41. Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Wis. 1974) (noting the social ramifications
of action and deferring problem to the legislature).
42. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (recovery
denied for lack of causation and because infant's damages were not cognizable at law);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691-93 (N.J. 1967) (recovery denied on grounds of
causation, impossibility of measuring damages, and public policy); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (action by infant for circumstances of his birth not cognizable at
law); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975) (infant's action
rejected on grounds of causation and damages). Contra, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1973), vacating and remanding 336 F.
Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (recovery for deformities of mongolism originally denied,
but allowed on appeal).
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Cosgrove.48 Gleitman involved a suit by an infant and his parents against a
physician who allegedly failed to inform the parents of the possible effects on
their child of the rubella contracted by the mother. The parents sought
damages for the emotional distress suffered by the mother and for the costs
to the father of rearing the child, while the infant sought damages for his
birth defects. The court noted the inability of the defendant to alleviate the
infant's condition by any means short of eliminating the infant's existence,
and noted the lack of any causation attributable to the defendant. 44 These
two factors, in addition to the difficulty of measuring damages and the
court's conception of public policy, required a denial of recovery on the
45
infant's cause of action.
This reasoning was followed without exception insofar as actions by the
infant were concerned until Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,Inc.46
There the action was brought by two mongoloid children who alleged that the
defendant's birth control pills formerly taken by their mother caused chromosome mutations which resulted in the infants' deformities. The complaint on
appeal was held to state a cause of action on two theories. First, the court
believed that favorable consideration should be given to the plaintiffs' claim
on motion to dismiss. 4 7 Second, the appellate court stated that after
conception the infants' chromosomes were affected by the altered chromo48
some structure of the mother's body.
The Jorgensen decision is a sharp reversal from the previous cases where
suit was brought by a child. While Jorgensen is clearly distinguishable from
the prior actions in that the deformities were not caused by rubella, it is by
no means free from problems of causation. The court recognized that on
remand causation would have to be proven, but ignored the medical facts
that would preclude proof of causation. 49 It is recognized today that the
genetic character of an individual is determined at the moment of conception, 50 so that for the court to state that a genetic deformity in the fetus may
be caused after conception by a change in the mother's chromosomes is
factually incorrect. The value of the decision as precedent is further
43. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).

44. Id. at 691-92.
45. Id. at 691-92.

The court's conception of public policy is reflected by their

statement that "the right to life is inalienable in our society." id. at 693.
46. 483 F.2d .237 (10th Cir. 1973).

47. Id. at 238. Under the appliciable law, a complaint should not be dismissed for

failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Id. at 239.
48. Id. at 239. The district court had refused to recognize a cause of action for the
plaintiffs on the ground that a child may not recover for injury to the ovum of its female
parent before it unites with the sperm in conception. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 961, 962 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
49. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir.
1973).
50. H. CURTIS, BIOLOGY 399 (1968).
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weakened by the presumptions in favor of the plaintiff attendant to the
procedural form of the action. 51 Apparently the Jorgensen decision is
incorrect. While the mother was clearly damaged if her chromosomes were
distorted by the use of the contraceptive, and it is conceivable that her
damages would include the deprivation of her ability to have a normal child,
it is very difficult to view the defendant's conduct as wrongful toward an
unconceived, potential fetus.
The Measurement of Damages
Wrongful birth actions by infants who complain of their very existence
have not gained recognition. Furthermore, actions by parents for damages
for the birth of a child have received a mixed reception because of the close
relationship between the two types of actions. One of the primary causes of
this confusion, and one of the chief obstacles to recovery in both instances
has been the difficulty encountered in the measurement of damages. 52
In both tort and contract actions, the purpose in awarding monetary
damages is compensation.5 3 In contract actions, the objective of a court is
to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in had the
breach not occurred, while in tort actions the objective is to return the
plaintiff to his position prior to the wrongful act.5 4 Implicit in this scheme of
compensation is knowledge of a plaintiff's prior condition so that a nonspeculative comparison can be made. This problem has plagued plaintiffs in
wrongful birth actions, and although the difficulty is particularly acute where
the infants are concerned, the parents have also encountered impediments in
proving damages. These obstacles may be illustrated by an examination of
the types of damages sought by the various plaintiffs and the disposition of
their claims by the courts.
The parents who have sued for damages as a result of the birth of a child
fall into two categories: parents of children who were born with birth defects,
and those whose children were normal, although unplanned or unwanted.
In actions by the parents of a normal child, the uniformly recognized rule
51. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.
1973) (all facts favorable to plaintiff are presumed on motion to dismiss).
52. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967); Hays v. Hall, 477
S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d
412 (Tex. 1973).
53. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257 (1924); Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94,
99 (1867); United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 899 (1958).
54. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257 (1924) (contract); Tucker v. Calmar
Steamship Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973) (tort). See generally 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956); H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO
PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 1, at I (rev. ed. 1961).
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prior to 1967 was that apart from the question of liability for the performance
of an unsuccessful sterilization operation, no damages resulted from the birth
of a normal child where no permanent harm was incurred by the mother. 55
The rationale for this view was that the birth of a normal child could not be
considered an injury, and that an award of such damages would be against
public policy. 56 The initial decision in this line of cases, Christensen v.
Thornby,5 7 expressed the view that damages incident to the bearing of a
child were too remote from the purpose of a sterilization operation.58 Stating
a prediction, the court declared that the parents had as much chance of
recovering for the expense of childbirth as they did for the cost of supporting
and educating the child during its minority. 59 Within a few years, parents
were seeking such damages. 60
The rationale of the Christensen decision denying the possibility of any
damages for the birth of a normal child was first questioned in Custodio v.
Bauer.61 There the parents sought to recover damages following an unsuccessful sterilization operation for the medical expenses incident to the operation, physical pain and mental anguish incident to the pregnancy, and for the
economic loss occasioned by the unwanted child. The California Court of
Appeals rejected the reasoning of Christensen and allowed recovery for the
provable economic loss, 62 thus explicitly recognizing that the birth of a child
may be less than a "blessed event."' 63 Since Custodio other courts have
awarded damages to the parents for the birth of a normal child. 64 Neither
55. Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934); Ball v. Mudge, 391
P.2d 201, 204 (Wash. 1964). This rule was followed in Texas in Hays v. Hall, 477
S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d
412 (Tex. 1973). The rationale of the pre-1967 rule was affirmed in Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 927 (1974), although the court of civil appeals did recognize that a child may
not always be a benefit. Id. at 128.
56. Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 927 (1974); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973); Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d
201, 204 (Wash. 1964).
57. 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934).
58. Id. at 622.
59. Id. at 622.
60. Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (Wash. 1964).
61. 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77 (Ct. App. 1967).
62. Id. at 477. The court reasoned that even where the mother survives without
injury some loss is sustained. The amount of this loss is the result of spreading her
familial duties over a larger group. Id. at 476.
63. Id. at 475. Unquestionably, the circumstances of the particular case before
them influenced the court. Mr. and Mrs. Custodio were the parents of nine children
prior to the sterilization operation.
64. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d 511, 517-18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 340
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1975). Contra, Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974) (recovery denied on grounds that such damages are too speculative); Terrell v.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 1, Art. 9

19761

COMMENTS

the Christensen nor the Custodio approach, however, has received universal

acceptance.15

The parents of children born with birth defects have also had difficulty
recovering damages. The precedent denying recovery was established in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,6 where the New Jersey Supreme Court noted its
sympathy for the plight of the parents, but held that the right of the child to
67
live was greater than their right to avoid emotional and financial injury.
Subsequent cases by the parents of deformed children illustrate that the
law is moving in the direction of allowing some recovery, although at least
one case has followed the rationale of Gleitman in denying recovery.68 The
cases that have allowed recovery have awarded damages equal to the
economic burden caused by the child's defects. 69 The reasoning behind this
limited award of damages was outlined in Jacobs v. Theimer,70 where the
Texas Supreme Court catalogued the objections to suits for life itself and
held that an objection to the measurability of damages in such cases was
understandable. 71 The economic burden resulting from the physical defects
of the child, however, was held to be within the usual methods of proof.
Thus, the court in Jacobs correctly distinguished suits for wrongful birth from
suits seeking damages for injuries casually related to life, noting that the
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (recovery denied on public policy grounds); Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Wis. 1974) (recovery denied on public
policy grounds).
65. Cause of action stated: Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Ct. App.
1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d .511, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (N.J.
1967). Action denied: Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.W. Va. 1967);
Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Wis. 1974). In
Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) an attempt to compromise
was made. Rather than allow recovery for the entire cost of raising the child, the court
only approved recovery for the mother's pain and suffering, the cost of the operation, the
loss of consortium to the husband, and medical expenses. Id. at 761-62.
66. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
67. Id. at 693.
68. Doerr v. Villate, 220 N.E.2d 767, 768 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966) (recovery allowed for
medical expenses and other special care); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 313
N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (parent's cause of action denied); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (expenses necessary for the treatment of
the impairment awarded); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis.
1975) (compensatioin allowed for hospital, medical, and supportive expenses caused by
the deformity).
69. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975). The court in Dumer distinguished the
previous denial of a cause of action for the entire costs of raising an unwanted normal
child on the basis of the damages sought. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219
N.W.2d 242, 244 (Wash. 1974).
70. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
71. Id. at 849.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol8/iss1/9

12

Brantley: Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:140

latter actions may be handled by a traditional negligence approach. 72 The
recognition of this distinction, however, has not removed all obstacles to
recovery in actions by parents.
Both groups of parents have been hindered by two doctrines: the "benefits" rule and the rule governing mitigation of damages.

Under the "bene-

fits" rule, the defendant who simultaneously injures and confers a benefit to
the same interest of the plaintiff is entitled to have the benefit considered in
mitigation of damages. 73 The benefits rule has resulted in a complex

balancing of interests approach that has been praised for giving the trier of
fact the flexibility to evaluate each set of circumstances individually. 74 In
regard to its application barring recovery as a matter of law, however, the
benefits rule has been questioned. 75

Nevertheless, the fact that the parents

of a child receive some benefit has been considered in the litigation of claims
76
by parents.

The question of mitigating damages has arisen in the context of the
parents' action for damages caused by the birth of a child. The defendants
have attempted to require that the plaintiffs relinquish the benefit received

by allowing the child to be. adopted. 7 7 The courts have refrained from
attempting to enforce such a requirement, but have considered the ramifications of allowing a plaintiff to retain that which he claims has damaged him
78
when it has also benefited him.
The questions of mitigation of damage and the benefits rule have been
absent in actions by children for their own injuries. The prior born children

have asked for monetary compensation for the reduction of their share of
love, affection, and future financial support caused by the birth of their
sibling. 79

These claims have been uniformly denied,80 on the theory that

72. Id. at 849.
73. In Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974), the court recognized that a child is
not always a profitable event when considered from the economic point of view alone,
but noted that the intangible value of a child's smile cannot be measured. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
74. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
75. Id. at 517.
76. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Ct. App. 1967); Gleitman
v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219
N.W.2d 242, 244 (Wash. 1974).
77. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (reasonable
measures to mitigate damages are required and best interest of child must be considered);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Wis. 1975) (dissenting opinion);
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Wash. 1974) (retention of child
implies a parental benefit received that is relevant to issue of public policy).
78. Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 27071 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (dissenting opinion); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219
N.W.2d 242, 245 (Wash. 1974).
79. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (reduction in
amount of care and support); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App.
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while children may expect future care, affection, and pecuniary support, they
have-no vested right to it. 81 The parents may disinherit the children, or
offer them for adoption, in which case the child may be deprived of any right
in the parent's estate.8 2 Moreover, the courts have found no correlation
between the wrongful act of the defendant and the damages claimed by the
88
infants.
Actions by deformed children have also been poorly received. These
children normally seek monetary compensation for their birth defects and
permanently impaired capacity to enjoy life. 84 The courts denying recovery
have been impressed by the logical inconsistency of the infant's position,8 5
and by the public policy favoring the preservation of life.80 The inconsistency lies in the nature of damages as compensation. The court in Gleitman
stated that it "cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the
nonexistence of life itself,"8 7 so that by alleging that he should have been
aborted, the plaintiff renders it impossible for the court to make the
comparison required by the compensatory remedy.88 In Stewart v. Long
Island College Hospital,s9 the New York Superior Court referred to the
compensation of individuals for wrongs against them as the basic rationale of
the law of torts.90 Since the ultimate wrong is the causation of death, it
would be antithetical to tort principles to require a defendant to respond in
damages for failing to consign the plaintiff to oblivion.91
Illegitimate children have confronted problems similar to those of deformed children in their claims for damages. ,Illegitimate children have
1974) (diminution of love, affection, and pecuniary interests); Cox v. Stretton, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (reduction in care, affection, training, and financial
support).
80. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760-61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Aronoff v.
Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834,
840-41 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
81. Cox v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
82. Id. at 840.

83. Id. at 840.
84. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 238 (10th Cir.
1973) (retardation, deformity, pain, and suffering); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp.
654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (birth defects); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 690
(N.J. 1967) (birth defects); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502,
503 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (birth defects); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233
N.W.2d 372, 374 (Wis. 1975) (retardation and impaired ability to enjoy life).
85. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (applying
Texas law); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1968), a/f'd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (Wis. 1975).
86. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967).
87. Id. at 692.
88. Id. at 692.
89. 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), afd, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1972), af'd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
90. Id. at 46.
91. Id. at 46.
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sought to recover for the mental pain, humiliation, and embarrassment
incident to being stigmatized a bastard, in addition to damages for the
deprivation of property rights and a normal home life. 92 Without exception,
recovery for these damages has been denied.93 The reasoning for denial
was expressed in Pinkney v. Pinkney94 as the common understanding that
"no one has an inalienable right to be born under one set of circumstances
rather than another or to one pair of parents rather than another."9 5 In
one case the court found that the putative father had committed a tortious
act, but still denied recovery in view of the possible social ramifications.96
The question of damages has been a crucial consideration in allowing or
denying recovery, but a trend is discernible when the various cases are
distinguished according to the party bringing the action. Where the plaintiffs are the parents, the courts have been permitting recovery for provable
medical expenses associated with the birth and maintenance of the deformed
child, however, the entire cost of raising a normal child is viewed as too
speculative. 97 Where the children bring the action, the impossibility of
measuring damages has been an insurmountable difficulty. 98 Even if it
were possible to prove damages in all cases, however, the defendant still may
prevail if he can raise a defense to the action.
AVOIDANCE OF LIABILITY

Defendants have employed various defenses to avoid liability, depending
on the particular factual situation. An obvious defense, but one subject to
many objections, is lack of precedent. The defense that the claim is novel,
however, has not been an effective one.9 9 Our judicial system has never
92. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967) (stigma of

bastardy); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 851 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964) (deprivation of plaintiff's right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal

home, to have a legal father, to inherit from father and paternal ancestors, and for being
stigmatized a bastard); Williams v. State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (19,66) (deprivation of
property rights, normal childhood, proper parental support, and for stigma of illegitimacy); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Wis. 1974) (mental pain, anguish, and
humiliation).
93. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda,
190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v.
State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (1966); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Wis.
1974).
94. 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
95. Id. at 54.
96. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 857-58 (IlL. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1964).
97. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761-62 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975).
98. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975).
99. Williams v. State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (1966).
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allowed a la&k of precedent to defeat recovery when the elements of a tort
are present. 100
The most important defense to the wrongful birth actions has been the
proposition that to allow recovery for life itself violates the public policy
favoring life. This defense was first raised in actions seeking damages for the
birth of a normal child, 101 and has since been used repeatedly to bar
recovery in a variety of cases. 10 2 This defense has exhibited a remarkable
tenacity in the face of recent judicial questioning of its validity. 10 3 The
ramifications of the public policy defense were extensively developed in
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,' 0 4 where the court noted that even when
the chain of causation is complete, recovery may be denied on one of six
public policy reasons. 0 5
Finally, the courts themselves have provided the defense of immeasurable
damages. As previously indicated, this defense has been an effective bar to
recovery. 10 6 In some cases, however, the courts have deferred this problem
to the legislature because of the possible social effects of allowing recov10 7
ery.
100. Id. at 886. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 3-4
(4th ed. 1971) (discussing lack of precedent).
101. Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (Minn. 1934).
102. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Wis. 1974).
Contra, Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Ct. App. 1967); Jackson v.
Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
103. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967). This was the first case
in which the public policy favoring family planning was given equal consideration with
the policy favoring life. Id. at 477. After Custodio, revelations by demographers
concerning population growth rates and diminishing agricultural productivity have reinforced the need for effective population control. See, e.g., R. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 31 (1974); D. MEADows, LIMITS TO GROWTH 29 (1972); R.
PENNYCUICK, PEOPLE, POLLUTION, AND PAYMENT 10 (1973).
104. 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1974).
105. Id. at 244. The public policy reasons given by the court were: (1) the injury is
too remote from the negligence; (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; (3) allowance of recovery would place an
unreasonable burden on the defendant; (4) in retrospect it appears highly unlikely that
the negligence should have brought about the harm; (5) allowance of recovery would be
too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; (6) allowance of recovery would be too
likely to enter a field that has no logical boundaries. Id. at 244.
106. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,
219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Wis. 1974).
107. Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Wis. 1974).
Another possible defense is the statute of limitations. This defense has not been
raised in any action by the children, but was unsuccessfully urged in an action for the
failure of a sterilization operation in Doerr v. Villate, 220 N.E.2d 767 (I11. Ct. App.
1966). In that case, the wife of the unsuccessfully sterilized patient sued for the expense

of raising the deformed child born to her as a result of the failure of the operation. The
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One defense not raised by the defendants in cases involving suits for
damages after an unsuccessful vasectomy is recanalization, although several cases have mentioned this possibility.' 0 8 In a vasectomy, the surgeon
severs and ligates the vas deferens. These tubes may spontaneously and
naturally reconnect despite the fact that the operation was skillfully and
correctly performed. The incidence of this reconnection, called recanalization, has been estimated at between zero and six percent. 10 9 This factor
may afford the defendant some factual basis for avoiding liability on grounds
of causation.
CONCLUSION

In the area of recovery for wrongful birth, confusion is rampant. This
state of affairs is a result of the failure to distinguish factually the various
actions which involve elements of the recovery for wrongful birth, but which
are not wrongful birth suits in the strict sense. Two particular classes of
suits contain elements of the wrongful birth suit, but should be distinguished
from the true wrongful birth actions by the courts: suits for prenatal injuries,
and suits by parents to recover the costs of raising a normal child born as the
result of negligent, ineffective sterilization. In the latter category, the courts
have relied on the reasoning of the wrongful birth suits, thus blurring the
distinctions between them. 110 The former class of cases are distinguishable
on the point of causation.
A prenatal injury case is not a suit for wrongful birth because the plaintiff,
although an infant, is not seeking damages for birth itself. Instead, the
plaintiff seeks damages for an injury which is attributable to a cause other
than mere birth; the cause of action for prenatal injuries is incidentally
related to birth. The damages sought are not for birth itself but for an injury
inflicted on the plaintiff prior to birth, the extent of which became known
only after birth. Furthermore, unless evidence can be found indicating the
presence of deformities prior to the accident, the measure of damages is
certain. The child as he exists can be compared with the normal child he
would have been. Thus, the complex problems of benefit and detriment are
defendant pleaded the two year statute of limitations in tort; however, the court held that
the plaintiff's claim was based on the breach of an oral contract, therefore the court
applied the four year statute of limitations for contracts. Id. at 770.
108. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (possibility of
recanalization prevents application of res ipsa loquitur); Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201,
204 (Wash. 1964) (possibility of recanalization termed a rarity).
109. Hackett & Waterhouse, Vasectomy Reviewed, 116 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC.
438, 446 (1973). The failure of a vasectomy to produce sterility is, according to these
authors, most commonly due to recanalization. Id. at 446. Another possible defense for
the doctor in this area is the occurrence of a congenital duplication of the vas deferens.
Id. at 446.
110. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); see Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Wash. 1974).
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absent in the prenatal injury case, and the court need not measure the void
of nonexistence.
Similarly, the action by the parents seeking damages for the birth of a
normal child subsequent to an unsuccessful sterilization can be distinguished
from the true action for wrongful birth. To the extent that the plaintiff is
seeking damages attributable to the birth of a child, his suit is within the
ambit of the wrongful birth action."1 This resemblance, however, should
not blind the courts to the true nature of the action. The parents sought a
particular surgical procedure to accomplish a desired result. Where an
operation performed for a designated purpose fails to achieve that purpose,
liability is properly placed upon the physician who failed to meet reasonable
medical standards, and this liability should include all foreseeable results.
The courts have been hesitant to impose this liability because of the
speculative nature of recovery for future costs of raising a child."12 This
objection is strengthened by the interplay of the benefits rule and the rule
concerning the mitigation of damages characteristic in such cases."'3
The solution to this enigma must begin with a clear understanding of what
a true wrongful birth action is. A true wrongful birth action is a suit brought
by a child to recover from a defendant whose conduct was a contributing
cause to his conception and birth." 14 It is an action seeking damages for
birth itself, not a distinct injury caused prior to birth. Under this definition,
the only suits that should be included in the term "wrongful birth" are those
by the illegitimate children 15 and those by the children who claim that they
should have been aborted."16
By adopting the strict approach outlined above, the courts may separate
the actions that involve damages for torts causally related to the birth of a
child from the actions where damages are sought for the existence of life
itself. 117 Thus, actions by the parents seeking damages for the cost of
111.

Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 n.ll (Ct. App. 1967).

112. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
113. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 344 A.2d 336, 339- (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975).
114. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 n.11 (Ct. App. 1967). See also

Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1968).
115.

Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190

N.E.2d 849 (I11.Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State,
276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1974).

116. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973);
Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227
A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972);

Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975). Theactions by the prior
born children are not true wrongful birth actions since the children do not seek damages
for their own birth. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Cox
v. Stretton, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 840 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
117. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
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raising a normal child may be more properly termed an action for "wrongful
pregnancy," since the pregnancy was the proximate result of the negligence,
and the birth a remote result. No special name is required, however, since
the basic principles of tort law should be applied. The court may award
damages for provable expenses, and deny recovery as to future costs on the
theory that they are too speculative. 118 This compromise is fair to the
plaintiff-parents who have been injured and to the defendant who should
compensate the plaintiff for the foreseeable results of his negligence without
being forced to pay speculative damages.
A somewhat different problem is posed by the birth of a deformed child
where a sterilization operation was sought to prevent such an occurrence. The
special costs incident to such a child are not speculative, but are measurable.
The problems of benefit and detriment are still present, since under the
prevailing view of public policy, at least some benefits accrue to the parents
of a retarded child, however intangible and ephemeral they may be.
Whether these joys outweigh the measurable costs is a question about which
reasonable men may differ and should be left to the jury. A balancing
approach considering all relevant factors surrounding the birth would seem
to be appropriate. 119 The solution to this dilemma will not be complete,
however, without an examination of the policy considerations involved in a
suit for wrongful birth.
When the first wrongful birth suits were initiated, the question of a conflict
in public policy did not arise.' 20 In recent years, however, family planning,
population control, and the mother's right of privacy have achieved the
status of recognized public policy.' 2 ' The preservation of life is also an
accepted policy, and the conflict is obvious.
The result of this variance in the two public policies is a judicial dilemma.
The courts cannot be expected to reflect the common customs and mores of a
118. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). The theory
was applied here with logical and equitable results. The physician was held accountable
for the pain, suffering, and discomfort of the mother, the cost of the operation, the loss
of consortium, and medical expenses resulting from the operation. The doctor was not
required to pay for the entire cost of raising the child because it would involve undue
speculative and ethically questionable assessments involving the benefits accruing to a
parent from having a child, the detriments from the fact that it was unplanned, and the
question of the duty to mitigate damages. Id. at 761.
119. See Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (discussing
balancing test as applied to normal child); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849
(Tex. 1975) (implicitly utilizing a balancing test).
120. See George, The Evolving Law of Abortion, in ABORTION, SOCIETY, AND THE
LAW, 3, 7 (D. Walbert and J. Butler eds. 1973).
121. Coleman, Family Planning, Population Control, and the Law, in LEGAL
MEDICINE ANNUAL 401, 410-14 (C. Wecht, ed. 1973). For a compilation of the laws of
each state relating to family planning, see HEW, FAmY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION,
AND VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED
STATES, EACH STATE AND JURISDICTION 134 (1971).
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159

society which is itself undecided. Until this conflict is resolved, the law
involving the various rights of the unborn will remain contradictory and in
constant flux. -It seems clear, however, that unless a consensus arises
favoring the right to recover for birth itself, these claims should continue to
be denied because of the impossibility of measuring damages, the logical
inconsistency of the suit, and lack of causation. In the words of Professor
Ploscowe:
There are some wrongs which must be suffered and the law cannot
to do so may do more damage
provide a remedy for them. To attempt
122
than if the law leaves them alone.
122. Ploscowe, An Action for Wrongful Life, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1078, 1080 (1963).
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